On Grounding for the Metaphysics of Morals by Immanuel Kant

Kant’s Grounding for the Metaphysics of Morals is written with the stated purpose of “seeking out and establishing the supreme principle of morality,” or to discover a method of morality derived from our reason alone that is normative for all rational beings. Under this overarching context, the first section, entitled From the Ordinary Knowledge of Morality to the Philosophical, seeks to formally define morality using practical and intuitive facts as the starting point and to investigate the conditions necessary for an action to be considered of moral good. Kant’s answer that an action is good only if the subjective principles upon which the action is derived (maxims) can be willed into universal law is however founded upon the problematic assumption that rationality exist to serve morality, without which renders the resulting conclusion inadequate as a judgement of morality.

Kant begins with the observation that the only conceivable unconditionally good thing in the world is the “good will,” where a will can be understood as the practical manifestation of rationality. For something to be unconditionally good, it cannot derive its goodness from something else. Thus, this good will is good “only through its willing,” in other words entirely intrinsic, without exception, and regardless its potential consequences. This is in direct opposition to what Kant calls “talents of mind” such as intelligence, wit, judgement or “qualities of temperament” such as courage, resolution, perseverance, all of which derive their favorability from the results they achieve. Kant further observes that in the composition of a being suitable for the purpose of living, all its components are most fit and adapted to serve this purpose. Given this premise, if a being’s happiness were its “real end of nature,” then it follows that reason would not appear very suitable to achieve that end. This is evident in the observation that the more reason is devoted and applied to happiness, the less happiness is actually attained, leading to hatred of reason among rational beings and an envy of “the more common run of men” whose actions are dictated more so by natural instinct than reason and are happier as a result. Consequently, Kant argues that there must lie a “much more worthy purpose” than happiness for which reason is intended, this being the aforementioned supreme principle of morality. Kant supposes that our reason must serve a higher purpose, and since it clearly does not serve our aims of happiness (loosely defined as pursuits of material preservation and welfare), reason must exist for the purpose of producing morality in the form of an unconditionally good will that is good in itself and of the highest order. Though it may curb happiness, which Kant describes as “always conditioned” and of secondary importance, reason is for the purpose of an unconditional good will which is supremely fulfilling.

There are several points of contentions to be made here, most prominently that on what grounds the assumption is made that reason serves morality, or that it needs to serve anything at all, is left unaddressed. There is a significant leap of logic in the assertion that just because rationality fails to serve happiness, therefore it must serve morality, when it could just as strongly be argued to serve a number of arbitrary entities suitable for a being’s existence. Furthermore, that all things must serve something, implicit in this observation, is not a trivial assumption to make, yet again remains without explanation. Taking this into consideration, Kant fails to establish a robust relationship between the good will and rationality, leaving the two entities independent. Consequently, though morality could still be derived from reason, there is no good reason to believe so. Likewise, Kant also does not motivate why adherence to morality is fundamentally more fulfilling than pursuits of happiness (this is partially addressed, however inconsistently, in later sections with the introduction of the categorical imperative). These key assumptions are taken to be self-evident, likely a result of the cultural and theological context shaping the general worldview of the time; however, when taken out of that context and forced to stand alone, these premises fail to hold and create problems for Kant’s conclusion, as will become increasingly evident.

From the two initial observations, Kant arrives at his conclusion by way of three propositions. For his first proposition, Kant illustrates through three types of actions that the contents of an unconditionally good will from which we judge and condition our action comes to us in the form of “duty” (later defined as necessity to act out of respect for moral law), or in other words, a morally good action is motivated solely by this duty. Kant disregards two trivial scenarios in which either actions contradict duty or actions in accordance to duty are performed not from natural inclination but for external means, both of which it is easily determined that duty is not the adhered purpose and consequently cannot be deemed morally good. Of especial interest is the third category of actions that are in accordance to duty but for which there also exists an immediate natural inclination, in which case the action can be deemed of genuine moral worth only if it is motivated by duty alone. For instance, a dealer who sells at a fair price not because he is forced to by competition but because he wishes to serve his customers honestly is acting from duty, thus his actions are of moral worth. In his second proposition, Kant introduces the concept of maxims, referring to subjective principles according to which an action is determined. According to Kant, an action’s moral worth can only be derived from maxims governing the act and not from its intended purpose. This implies that when a performed action is compelled by duty alone, it must have been considered purely a priori (via maxims). This point subtly expands upon the previous proposition by providing a personalized and situational context to an action’s morality, for maxims are implementations of duty uniquely tailored to the individual and to each action (but nevertheless adhered to as if universal). Building off the two previous propositions, Kant finally proposes that duty is “the necessity of an action done out of respect for the law.” Thus, the determination of will rests exclusively on the maxim that one should follow the law (what this law consists of is left undefined here, the determination only dictates that such a law exists). From these postulations, Kant presents a complete trajectory of how a good action and morality itself comes to being. Morality consists of representations of law, and by acting according to maxims is how one comes to possess moral good regardless the empirical outcome.

If we take Kant’s assumptions to be valid, then we are now able to logically construct the conditions necessary for an action to be good, answering the initially posed question. It has been established that for something to be considered morally good, it must be derived from an unconditionally good will, which is in turn derived a priori from our rationality. It follows that in order for an action to be good, it must follow maxims established a priori, implemented in the form of duty defined as respect of law. An action that is morally pure must be derived from a morally pure law, which in turn must be uncontaminated by empirical experience and thus applicable universally. As result, a law which determines a will that is unconditionally good can only be a universal law. This logic is commutative, allowing us to work backwards to determine the moral validity of an action. Maxims are morally good only if it can be willed into, or fitting as a principle of, universal law. Subsequently, an action can be considered morally good only if the maxims from which the actions are derived are also of moral value. Combining the last two points, we arrive at the following conclusion: an action is good only if the maxim upon which it is based can be willed into universal law. This is illustrated in the example of lying, which Kant sees as immoral regardless the circumstance because lying cannot possibly be willed universally. If every rational being adhered to a universal maxim to profess untruthfully, then belief would be impossible and the situation would contradict itself.

It is evident that this logical progression fails if we cannot assume that rationality exists for the purpose of morality. If a rational being’s capacity to reason does not serve the production of good will, then morality may be derived from sources other than our rationality, in which case morally good maxims are not necessarily a priori and consequently do not need to be fitting as universal law. This does not nullify the assertion that maxims fitting as universal law are morally good, which remains ambiguous but in all likelihood still valid, but instead only implies that there could exist maxims of moral value that are also unfit as universal law. As a result, Kant’s insistence that an action’s moral validity be evaluated on its maxim’s potential as universal law is no longer a necessary condition. A partial remedy potentially resides in the motivation behind producing such a philosophy, which Kant claims to be not merely for sake of philosophy but on practical grounds. Kant concedes that his moral philosophy serves only to formalize intuitive processes made spontaneously in practically, that “ordinary” judgments are often correct, perhaps even more likely than reason, the complexity of which may easily result in confusion. This begs the question as to why we require a deeper philosophical explanation of morality in the first place. Kant responds by warning against any willful ignorance that may result from this false sense of security, arguing that a mind not cognizant of moral law is easily susceptible to the numerous “powerful counterweight to all the commands to duty” and can deviate from pursuits of moral worth in favor of inclinations for sake of happiness. Thus, it is imperative and practically necessary to investigate beyond the practical to seek the source of its own principle, for it is through this understanding that a rational being can avoid fallacious pitfalls. Considering this added qualification, it may be reasonable to assume that much of Kant’s purpose in writing is simply for us as rational beings to examine the motivations behind our actions. The intended outcome here is not that we must scrutinize whether a maxim should necessarily be feasible as universal law, but that we critically consider our motivations at all before implementing actions.