On The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism by Max Weber

In writing, Weber seeks to trace the origins for his observation that the upper echelon of business leaders in a denominationally mixed German society tend to be predominantly Protestant as opposed to Catholic. Weber systematically proceeds with his analysis by initially suggesting a potential explanation, disproving or qualifying it through a further observation, then narrowing down the original question and repeating the process. Though the methodology is sound and consistent, Weber’s observations are frequently characterized by subjectivity too narrow in scope for robust inference, problematic especially for a philosophy that emphasizes scientific rationality. Due to its deliberately selected observations that lack exhaustive empirical validity, Weber’s method of inquisition, though applicable in specific cases, is susceptible to contradictions that may undermine the universality of the philosophy.

To set up the problem, Weber begins with the outright assertion that “business leaders and owners of capital, as well as the skilled higher strata of the labor force…tend to be predominantly Protestant.” Weber entertains the idea that religious allegiance is determined by economic forces, as might be suggested by the observation that wealthier regions in terms of geography and natural resources embraced Protestantism more readily. This argument, however, is discredited on grounds that the most economically developed areas also have a higher propensity for revolution. Though it can appear that wealth causes people to doubt their religiosity and subsequently rebel, for Weber, “reformation meant less the entire removal of ecclesiastical authority over life than the replacement of the previous form of authority by a different one.” Furthermore, Weber asserts that there is no causal relationship between the greater wealth passed on to protestants and the outstanding proportion of Protestants in higher positions of business. This is evidenced by the observation that, when compared to Protestants, Catholics in secondary education are much less likely to pursue disciplines “designed to prepare pupils for technical studies and commercial and business careers,” which, while potentially explaining low participation in capitalism, cannot be attributed to their wealth. Moreover, Weber notes the Catholic tendency to remain in craft work, even becoming master craftsmen, whereas Protestants tend to fill the more skilled work and management roles. Through these observations, Weber concludes that “the choice of occupation and future career has undoubtedly been determined by the distinct mental characteristics which have been instilled into them and indeed by the influence on them of the religious atmosphere of their locality and home background,” engendering a conundrum going against the conventional expectation that religious minorities, Catholics in this case, should feel pressured to pursue business when politically excluded, as was the case historically with Poles, Huguenots, Quakers, and Jews.

Having narrowed the problem to “mental characteristics” of Catholicism itself, Weber suggests as an explanation the supposed “unworldliness” of Catholicism, an ascetic propensity to turn inward and remain indifferent towards materialistic goods. Yet historically, Puritans were also characterized by “the very opposite of enjoyment of life”; despite this, significant capitalist advancements have been carried out under Protestantism, as epitomized by Calvinists who are marked by the same intense “unworldliness” found in German Catholics. In fact, Weber notices an exceptionally high “number of representatives of the most introspective forms of Christian piety who come from commercial circles.” Though attempts have been made to attribute exemplary capitalist behavior as a reaction against asceticism, it is repeatedly observed “in the same persons and groups of people a virtuoso capitalist commercial sense coincides with the most intense forms of a piety which permeates and regulates the whole life,” with Protestants again embodying this relationship. Through these observations, Weber formulates his problem as that “if an inner affinity between the old Protestant spirit and modern capitalist culture is to be found,” it must be lie in its “purely religious features.”

First and foremost, the reliability of quantitative evidence of the time and method of statistical inference raises questions regarding the validity of Weber’s observations, especially for a philosophy that prioritizes scientific rationality. For instance, the claim that Protestants are overrepresented among the upper stratum of business, the foundational motivation behind the entire text, is inherently subjective, dependent on normative metrics for classifying capitalistic success, and necessitates comprehensive supporting data. Necessarily assuming all observations to be valid for sake of argument, a more problematic issue lies in what evidence Weber elects to utilize, or more importantly to not utilize, to support his argument. Weber’s analysis begins with the observation that Protestants are more capitalistic than Catholics in Germany, and through further observations on the same population, concludes that capitalistic tendencies must have developed because of religious features of Protestantism. Because Weber concentrates on German Catholicism and Protestantism, his conclusion regarding the development of the capitalist spirit can only be rationally applicable to the case of German Catholics and Protestants. For other groups of people in other parts of the world, it may be the case that the opposite holds true, that wealth drive belief and religious tendencies are a result of economic forces. Historic exceptions to which Weber’s theory fails to apply, perhaps an outstandingly capitalistic people characterized by sybaritic tendencies or, on the other hand, Protestants or groups with similar values who remain economically undeveloped, can potentially dislocate Weber’s analysis and undermine his conclusions. Instead, Weber assumes a universality for ideas as the driver of change, which is further developed in subsequent analyses.

Weber constructs the “Spirit of Capitalism” as a complex configuration “in historical reality which we group together conceptually from the point of view of their cultural significance to form a single whole.” Weber concedes that in dealing with such concepts, it is impossible to provide a formal definition at the outset, but that a conclusion can be arrived through “provincial illustrations” taken from historical reality. To demonstrate this ideal, Benjamin Franklin is referenced as “the characteristic voice of the ‘spirit of capitalism,’” centered around “the duty of the individual to work toward the increase of his wealth, which is assumed to be an end in itself.” Franklin’s virtues, such as punctuality, hard work, and moderation, are strictly utilitarian, useful to the extent that they bring greater credit and capacity for making money. Yet, appealing to the ethos of Franklin, who was convinced his discovery of such maxims as divine revelation and subscribed to an absolute avoidance of wantonness, Weber asserts Franklin’s virtues to be free from hedonistic motives. Under this system, though the pursuit of profit is the primary purpose of life under capitalism, “this is no longer merely the means to the end of satisfying the material needs of life,” and a religious dedication to moneymaking as an “expression of diligence in one’s calling” forms the basis of the morality of capitalism. It is further observed that contemporary capitalist economic order forces its participants to act in accordance to such norms, rewarding the most virtuous and eliminating those who fail to conform by means of “economic selection.” Having clarified the “spirit of capitalism,” Weber claims that this attitude must have been held in common by a group of people. Furthermore, Weber asserts that the “capitalist spirit” must have existed prior to any “capitalist development,” observing that the most advanced American colonies were founded for religious purposes, whereas the less developed southern colonies were founded for business purposes, indicating a direct causal relationship. From these observations, Weber deduces ideas and beliefs as the fundamental driver of change and determining factor in economic institutions, a direct rejection and reversal of the “naïve historical materialism” put forth by Marx, who saw economic superstructures as the decisive driving force behind beliefs.

Here, Weber focuses exclusively on American colonies as the embodying paragon of the “spirit of capitalism.” From Franklin’s virtues, Weber sees the capitalist work ethic to be an end in itself; however, Franklin’s virtues are reflective of capitalist ethic only in the American case. Likewise, the subsequent claim that the “spirit” precedes development, based on the American north-south economic divide, can only be reasonably argued for the American case. Weber’s extremely narrow sample set of evidence centered around American and German Protestantism is especially susceptible to contradiction. Critics need only to point to a historic counter-example, for instance a people that pursues capitalism to a hedonistic end or Protestant ethics that fail to succeed capitalistically, to uphold a contrasting perspective. Regardless whether such counter-examples exist, Weber’s failure to address a broader range of examples weakens his conclusions and opens his work to such criticism; as the work stands, Weber could have easily selected examples that already fit his suppositions then circularly argued for his theory, ignoring empirical evidence that might indicate otherwise. Nevertheless, it must also be qualified that Weber’s problematic observations do not invalidate the rest of the analysis. Weber successfully argues for ideas as the sociological origins of capitalism in the German and American Protestant case and his theory has potential to be applicable comprehensively; however, to rationally infer such universality, much greater research involving a much wider range of empirical observations is necessary. Unlike philosophers such as Marx or Nietzsche, who theorize dialectical ideologies and apply them to historical circumstance, even prescribing for and projecting into the future (as with communism), Weber’s evidence-based methodology of argument begins with empirical evidence from which a narrative is derived, resulting in analytical conclusions that are more concretely based in historical reality; however, for this method to produce robust and comprehensive results, significant empirical research is required to avoid misguided fallacies that arise when selectively gathering evidence that already fit the preconceived theory.